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and that the contract need not contain a provision requiring notice
to be transmitted to him. The designated tribunal can then
adjudicate any conflicts arising out of their contractual relationship.
In the present case, this consent was achieved through use of
a contractual designation of an agent for service of process in such
foreign formn. The Court stated that due process was satisfied
even though the contract did not provide for notice to be given
to the defendants. The principal case would not appear to
sustain jurisdiction on similar facts if no effort is made to give
the defendant actual notice. However, the Court did not consider
a situation in which no such notice had been given.
It is now certain that such in personam jurisdiction can be
obtained in the chosen forum without violating due process. That
conclusion has no bearing, however, on the doctrine of forum
non conveniens, which may cause the court to refuse to entertain
32
the case though it has unquestionably acquired jurisdiction.
It is probable that the state courts will now more readily
uphold the validity of such contractual designation. Since the
constitutionality of this clause has been upheld we can expect
an ever increasing use of such consent jurisdiction.
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HELD

Defendant, a registered advisory

2
service,' published a report which apprised its five thousand
subscribers of the investment potential of particular stocks. The
service, on at least five occasions, purchased listed stocks and,
without disclosing these prior purchases, recommended such stocks
for long-term investment. Following each recommendation the
price of such shares rose, and within two weeks the defendant
sold its shares at a substantial profit. The SEC, alleging violation
of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 [hereinafter referred to
as the Act] commenced a proceeding to enjoin this practice.

32
Emerson Quiet Kool Corp. v. Eskind, 32 Misc. 2d 1037, 228 N.Y.S.2d
839 (Sup. Ct 1957).
1 "'Invqstment Adviser' means any person who, for compensation, engages in the business of advising others, either directly or through publication or writings, as to the value of securities. . . ." Investment Advisers
Act §202 (a)(ll), 54 Stat. 847 (1940), 15 U.S.C. §80b-2 (11) (1958).
It is unlawful for an unregistered investment adviser to use the mails or
any other means of interstate commerce in connection with his advisory
business. Investment Advisers Act § 203(a), 54 Stat. 850 (1940), 15 U.S.C.
§ 80b-3 (a) (1958).
2 On several occasions the report was distributed to an additional 100,000
non-subscribers. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 306 F.2d 606,
612 (2d Cir. 1961) (Clark, J., dissenting), rev'd, 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
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Reversing both lower courts the United States Supreme Court
held that the defendant's practice, known to the trade as "scalping,"
operates as such "fraud or deceit" on a client as to be within the
prohibitions of the Act, even though neither intent to injure, nor
actual injury was shown. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau,
Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
Stock "scalping" consists of realizing a short-term profit on3
the direct or secondary market reaction to one's own advice.
The reaction is swift and certain, since generally only a small
percentage of the outstanding shares of most listed corporations
are actually traded 4 and a relatively small increase in demand can
significantly increase the price.5
Prior to the principal case there had been only a few injunction
proceedings concerning the anti-fraud provisions of the Act, most
of which were uncontested and none of which reached the Supreme
Court." The Act in part provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any investment adviser .

.

. directly or indirectly-

(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any client or
prospective client;
(2) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which
operates as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client. . . 7
The paucity of case law, however, does not prevent a detailed
study of the subject since the fraud provisions of the Act are
substantially the same as the fraud provisions of the Securities
Act of 1933,8 and the SEC Rule lOb-5, 9 both of which have
been the subject of exhaustive judicial interpretation. The decisions
under these provisions are instructive since words having a wellknown meaning in an act, are presumed to have the same meaning
Id. at 613.
4 CRANE, THE SOPHISTICATED INVESTOR 67

(1959);

N.Y. STOCK Ex-

CHANGE, FACT Boox 42 (1961).

The turnover percentage was approximately
12 per
cent in 1960 as compared to 37 per cent in 1936.
5
See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 202
(1963).
6 See 3 Loss, SECURITIES -REGULATION1515-16 (2d ed. 1961).
256 Stat. 852 (1940) 15 U.S.C. §80b-6 (1958).
8 68 Stat. 686 (19545, 15 U.S.C. §77q (a) (1958) provides in part:
"It shall be unlawful for any person . . . (1) to employ any device, scheme,
or artifice to defraud, or (2) to obtain money or property by means of any
untrue statement of a material fact . .. or (3) to engage in any transaction,
practice, or course of business which operates . . . as a fraud or deceit upon
the purchaser."
917 C.F.R. §240.10b-5 (1949) provides in part: "It shall be unlawful
for any person, directly or indirectly . . . a) To employ any device, scheme,

or artifice to defraud. b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact
....
c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security."
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in subsequent legislation unless the context requires otherwise.' 0
Neither Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 nor rule
lOb-5 is limited to the requirements of common-law deceit"
and it is therefore unnecessary for the SEC, in order to procure
an injunction under these provisions, to show express misrepresentation

12

or actual loss. 13

The acts, as thus construed, view

of conduct tending
the terms "fraud" and "deceit" as inclusive
14
to deceive or mislead the purchasing public.
The courts' reluctance to construe the securities acts as requiring proof of intent to injure and actual loss is illustrated
by the case of Norris & Hirshberg v. SEC,15 where the court

stated:
To say, as petitioner does, that every element of common-law fraud must
be proven . . . is to say that Congress had no purpose in enacting regulatory
statutes in this [securities] field and that its legislation in the field is
meaningless. On the contrary, it has long been recognized . . . that the
16
investing . . . public needs special protection in this specialized field.

Although the statute, as interpreted, rejects the restrictive
definition of common-law fraud, it retains the common-law concept
of fiduciary duty as determinative of the adviser's duty to his
client. That the relation is one of trust and confidence has been
recognized numerous times under the securities acts, 17 and by the
investment advisers themselves. 8 It is well settled that a party
in a trust relation with another is under a duty to make a full
disclosure of all material facts necessary to enable the other party

10 Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Co., 308 U.S. 106, 115 (1939); Keck v.
United States, 172 U.S. 434, 446 (1899) ; 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 6.
11 Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch. v. SEC, 264 F.2d 199,
210 (9th Cir. 1959) (concerning § 17(a)) ; Speed v. Transamerica Corp.,
99 F. Supp. 808, 831-32 (D. Del. 1955) (concerning rule lOb-5).
12 Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1943),
cert. denied, 321 U.S. 786 (1944).
13 Otis & Co. v. SEC, 106 F.2d 579, 582-83 (6th Cir. 1939). In SEC
v. Torr, 15 F. Supp. 315, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 1936), rev'd on other grounds,
87 F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1937), reaff'd on remand, 22 F. Supp. 602 (S.D.N.Y.
1938), the court held that "it is of no consequence that purchasers may
have obtained full value for their money. . . . Persons may be deceived and
yet suffer no financial loss."
14 Hooper v. Mountain Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960); Archer
See
v. SEC, 133 F.2d 795 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 767 (1943).
generally Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act, 43 YAIX L.J. 227
(1933).
15 177 F.2d 228 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
16 Id. at 233.
17 Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, supra note 12; SEC v. Torr, supra
note 13; see 2 Loss, SECURITIEs REGuLATION 1412 (2d ed. 1961).
18 Hearings on S. 3580 Before Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 719 (1941).
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to determine whether he should act upon the fiduciary's advice. 19
An adviser's failure to disclose the fact that he has taken a
position in a stock is apparently regarded as improper by the
securities industry itself.2 0 In addition to the attitude of the
business community, the congressional reports on securities legislation
indicate that the fundamental purpose of such legislation is the
protection of investors. 21 This protection was accomplished by
substituting the doctrines of "let the seller beware"22 and full
disclosure for the ancient doctrine of caveat emptor, in an effort
to achieve a high standard of ethics in the securities industry.
SEC v. Torr,23 a case arising under Section 17(a) of the
Securities Act of 1933, is an example of both the liberal construction of "fraud" and an adviser's duty to disclose. In Torr,
defendant advisers had been promised commissions for every sale
of a security attributable to their influence. 24 The court held
that despite defendants' good faith belief 2 in the propriety of
the investment, their failure to disclose their position and interest
in the stock recommended operated as an imposition and deceit
on purchasers.2 6
The court commented that the preliminary
injunction restraining the defendants from further violation would
have been granted even if none of defendants' clients had suffered
27
financially.

'9 Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928); PRossER,
ToRvs 534-35 (2d ed. 1955).
20 See 2 NEv YORK STocK EXCHANGE GUIDE f[
2474 A. 10 (1958), recom-

mending that advisers disclose their interest.
21 S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933); see S. REP. No. 1775,
76th Cong., 3d Sess. 21 (1940): "The nature of the functions of the investment advisers, their increasing widespread activities, their potential influence on security markets and the dangerous potentialities of stock market
tipsters imposing upon unsophisticated investors, convinces this committee
that protection of investors requires the regulation of investment advisers

on22a national scale."
H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933).
23

Supra note 13.
24 The effect of advisers' recommendations is clearly shown by this case
where trading in the recommended stock rose from 400 shares daily to 2,400
shares daily with an accompanying price increase from three to four and
three-eighths dollars. SEC v. Torr, supra note 13, at 316-17.
25 Even before the securities acts it had been held that an adviser's belief
in the soundness of his advice was immaterial. Ridgely v. Keene, 134 App.
Div. 647, 119 N.Y. Supp. 451 (2d Dep't 1909).
"The law takes
into account human frailty, and absolutely forbids the assumption of conflicting obligations and duties. . . ." Id. at 649, 119 N.Y. Supp. at 452.
26 On the existence of a duty to disclose, see 3 RESTATEmENT, ToRTs

§551(2)
(1938).
27

Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d 968, 974-75 (D.C. Cir. 1949).

The court

held that the adviser's position as fiduciary required the disclosure of "every
element of adverse interest" and that violations of the anti-fraud provisions
would be made out even if all of the adviser's clients had profited by the
advice.
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In the principal case Mr. Justice Goldberg, writing for the
majority, stated that the terms "fraud" and "deceit" were used
"remedially" and not "technically" in the Act and that Congress
"did not intend to require proof of intent to injure and actual
injury to the client." 28 To require the SEC to show deliberate
dishonesty would "effectively nullify the protective purpose of the
statute." 29 Recognizing the defendant's position as one of trust
and confidence, the Court stated that he was required to make
a full disclosure of his personal interest in a recommendation,
regardless of his belief in its propriety.8 0 Failure to disclose was
held to be "fraud" or "deceit" within its intended meaning in
the Act. The defendant's argument against this conclusion, on
the ground that failure to disclose material facts had not been
made specifically unlawful by the Act, as it had by the Securities
Act of 1933,31 was considered and rebutted by the Court. Citing
case law, which has uniformly treated non-disclosure as one variety
of "fraud" or "deceit," 82 and to the purpose and philosophy of
the Act, the, Court concluded that Congress must have "deemed a
specific proscription against non-disclosure surplusage." 33
Mr. Justice Harlan, in his dissenting opinion, expressed the
belief that "the nondisclosed facts indicate no more than that the
respondents [defendants] personally profited from the foreseeable
reaction to sound and impartial investment advice." 34 He asserted
that there was no proof that the recommendations were based
upon anything other than a belief in the soundness of the advice,33
and further, that there was nothing in the Act's legislative history
which "lends support to the absolute rule of disclosure" pronounced
by the majority. 86
In the light of its background, the Court's decision in the
principal case is not surprising, but rather, a logical step in the
28 SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., supra note 5, at 195.
The practicality of such a holding is clear since proof of damages is particularly difficult in the securities area. 1 HARPER & JAmEs, ToRTs 597
(1956). For a discussion of the problems involved in the valuation of
securities, see Note, 37 CoLum. L. REV. 134 (1937).
29 SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., supra note 5, at 200.
30 "The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 'was directed not only at
dishonor, but also at conduct that tempts to dishonor.' " United States v.
Mississippi Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520, 549 (1961).
31 The specific -provision omitted from the Investment Advisers Act of
1940 is subdivision 2, of Section 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1933 which provides: "It shall be unlawful . . . (2) to obtain money or
property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission
to state a material fact. . . ." 48 Stat. 84 (1933).
32 See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 198
n.52 (1963).
33 Id. at 199.
34 Id. at 203-04.
35Id. at 204.
36 Id.at 206.
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expansive interpretation of securities legislation. The subscriber
is paying for an adviser's disinterested advice, which advice he
assumes is given in his best .interest. If an adviser is himself
a beneficial owner, his interest is at least potentially adverse to
his client's right to receive objective, unbiased advice. The requirement of disclosure is clearly more practical than absolutely
prohibiting an adviser from taking a position in a recommended
security.37 However, the use of an injunction to compel compliance
with the Act seems severe when its effect on an adviser's
reputation is considered.38 Furthermore, since an injunction is
directed to an individual and not to a practice, it provides a
partial solution at best.
The practical alternative to injunction proceedings is provided
by the 1960 amendments to the Act, empowering the SEC to
define and prescribe rules to prevent "fraudulent, deceptive, or
manipulative" practices.3 9 Under this provision, which received
little attention in the principal case, the Commission is empowered
to promulgate rules which will give notice to the industry of
the practices regarded by it as proper and improper. 40 As a
result, the possibility that injustice will be done will be minimized.
At least one thing is clear; armed with the liberal interpretation
given "fraud" in the principal case and its new rule-making power,
the SEC will undoubtedly be taking a more active role in the
regulation of investment advisers.

37 The adviser might want to legitimately purchase a security which he
plans to recommend so that his clients can purchase from his inventory at
a price which will not be inflated by the market's reaction to the recommendation.
38 Since an adviser's success depends, for the most part, on his reputation, the finding of "fraudulent practice" in a judicial proceeding is likely
to irreparably injure his business although he may have had no unlawful or
fraudulent intent.
39Investment Advisers Act §206, 54 Stat. 852 (1940), 15 U.S.C. §80b-6
(Supp. IV, 1963). In S. REP. No. 1760, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1960), it was
stated that "this provision would enable the commission to deal adequately
with such problems as a material adverse interest in securities which the
adviser is recommending to his clients." Although two of the violations
involved in the principal case took place after the effective date of this
amendment, it was not relied upon by the SEC.
40The Commission has already issued three regulations pursuant to its
rule-making power.
17 C.F.R. §275.204-2 (Supp. 1962) (requiring that
extensive records be kept); 17 C.F.R. § 275.206 (4)-1 (Supp. 1962) (dealing
with advertising practices); 27 Fed. Reg. 2150 (1962)
(concerning the
adviser's possession of his client's funds or securities).

